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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?
THE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED IN OUR
CRITICAL JUNCTURE
Robert W. McChesney*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Freedom of the press for whom?" That was the question that
Professor Jerome Barron raised some forty years ago.' It was a
revolutionary question because in six words it called into question the
dominant perception of freedom of the press, as it was commonly
understood at the time, and subsequently. It was a brave question too,
because it came at a time in which raising such a point was far from
popular, and easily misinterpreted and misunderstood. It stepped on very
powerful toes. It demanded that we come to terms with the political
economy of the media, and deal frankly with the implications of media
structures for media content. In many respects, Professor Barron was
decades ahead of his time, and all of us today owe him an enormous debt
of gratitude for his vision. In this Article, I would like to explain why I
think this question is, right now, in the process of being answered. And
if it is to be answered in a progressive manner, by the American people
and ultimately by the Supreme Court, it will be so done by people
standing on Professor Barron's shoulders.
Let me make clear what this Article is not: a legal treatise on the
First Amendment or constitutional law. What my Article will draw upon
is my work as a communication policy historian, and with that my
understanding of why we are in a rare period, a critical juncture, when
* Robert W. McChesney is the Gutgsell Endowed Professor at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign where he teaches in the Department of Communication. He has written several
books, most recently, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND THE FUTURE OF
MEDIA (New Press 2007). He is the co-founder and president of the media reform group Free Press,
www.freepress.net.
1. JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
MASS MEDIA (1973).
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the shape of the media system is undergoing a dramatic transformation.
As a result of this critical juncture it is likely that the Supreme Court will
revisit the issue "freedom of the press for whom?" And I suspect that
what happens politically in the coming years will influence how the
Supreme Court ultimately answers that question. So this Article will also
allude to what is happening "on the ground," so to speak. My Article
will also draw upon my work as an activist, to connect my research to a
broader public and intervene to see that this critical juncture results in
the best outcome possible.
II.

CRITICAL JUNCTURES

Allow me to elaborate: our communication system and, to a lesser
extent, our political economic system are now entering a critical
juncture, a period in which the old institutions and mores are collapsing
under long-run and powerful pressures. 2 The notion of critical junctures
was developed to explain how social change works; it became apparent
that there were relatively rare and brief periods in which dramatic
changes were debated and enacted drawing from a broad pallet of
options, followed by long periods in which structural or institutional
change was slow and difficult. During a critical juncture, which usually
lasts no more than one or two decades, the range of options for society is
much greater than it is otherwise. It is in effect like having an informal
"constitutional convention." The decisions put in place will establish
institutions and rules that will likely put us on a course that will be
difficult to change in any fundamental sense for decades or generations.3
This notion of critical junctures is increasingly accepted in history
and the social sciences, and it is has proven especially useful for
communication. Most of our major institutions in media are the result of
critical junctures, periods when policies could have gone in other
directions, and, had they done so, put media and society on a different
path. As a result of my research, I have concluded that critical junctures
in media and communication tend to occur when at least two of the
following three conditions hold: 1) there is a revolutionary new
communication technology that undermines the existing system; 2) the
content of the media system, especially the journalism, is increasingly
discredited and seen as illegitimate; and 3) there is a major political
2. See RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA:
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 36
(Princeton Univ. Press 1991).
3. See id. at 27-39.
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crisis in which the existing order is no longer working and there are
major movements for social reform. In the past century, media and
communication critical junctures occurred twice: In the Progressive Era
when journalism was in a deep crisis and the overall political system was
in turmoil; and in the 1930s when the emergence of radio broadcasting
was combined with the public's antipathy to commercialism against the
backdrop of the Depression. The result of the critical juncture in the
Progressive Era was the emergence of professional journalism; the result
of the critical juncture in the 1930s was the model of loosely regulated
commercial broadcasting, which provided the model for subsequent
electronic media technologies like FM radio, terrestrial television, and
cable and satellite television.
A.

The CurrentJuncture

We are in the midst of a profound critical juncture for
communication today. For the first time in American history the stars are
in alignment for a trifecta: the digital revolution is overturning all
existing media industries and business models; journalism is at its lowest
ebb since the Progressive Era; and our overall political system is awash
in levels of corruption and growing inequality that, in most cases, bring
on either periods of considerable political repression, or deep and
progressive structural reform. (The economy is in turmoil, too, and it
appears likely that we are entering a period of structural transformation
to points unknown.) Both professional journalism and commercial
broadcasting are in crisis and in a period of fundamental transformation.
All the longstanding presuppositions that communication scholars were
trained in, and that were taken for granted in our society, are much
weaker and arguably no longer hold. If we know anything at this point in
time it is that the communication system that emerges from this critical
juncture will look little like the communication systems of 1990 and
2000. And, already, the media system of the 1960s seems about as
relevant to what lies before us as a discussion of the War of the Roses
does to contemporary military strategists. Most important, we know that
how the emerging communication system is structured will go a long
way toward determining how our politics and economics will play out.
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Media Reform and the DigitalRevolution

This critical juncture has spawned the birth of an extraordinary
media reform movement in the past decade, especially since 2003. 4
Literally millions of Americans have engaged with media policy issues
in a manner that had been unthinkable for generations. Politicians and
regulators are discovering for the first time in their careers that what they
do with regard to media is being watched closely by voters and citizens
and they are beginning to respond. What remains to be seen is whether
there will be a broader resurgence of popular politics in the coming
period. If there is, it will shift the emerging "media reform movement"
into a much higher gear, and the range of possible outcomes will
increase dramatically. Such a boom in popular social movements would
also combine with media reform to lead, at the least, to the sort of
periodic reformation of institutions that happens every two or three
generations in American history, 5 and for which we are sadly overdue. If
such a broader popular political movement does not develop in the next
decade or so, there will still be a critical juncture in media and
communication; only the outcomes will be more likely to serve the
needs of dominant commercial and political interests.
C. Reforms in Recent History
1. 1900-1920
In media, there were two great twentieth century critical junctures.
The first critical juncture was during the late Gilded Age and
Progressive Era when United States journalism was increasingly the
domain of large commercial interests operating in semi-competitive or
monopolistic markets.6 Social critics ranging from Edward Bellamy to
Henry Adams were highly critical of the corrupt and anti-democratic
nature of United States journalism, owing to its private ownership and
its reliance upon advertising.7 Between 1900 and 1920 numerous
muckrakers and social commentators wrote damning criticism of the
anti-democratic nature of mainstream journalism. In many respects, this
4.

See

generally ROBERT

W.

MCCHESNEY,

THE

PROBLEM

OF

THE

MEDIA:

U.S.

COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 252-97 (2004) [hereinafter MCCHESNEY, THE
PROBLEM] (focusing on the changes in the media since 2003).

5.

Id. at 39-48.

6. OUR UNFREE PRESS: 100 YEARS OF RADICAL MEDIA CRITICISM 11-12 (Robert W.
McChesney & Ben Scott eds., 2004) [hereinafter OUR UNFREE PRESS].
7. See generally EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD: 2000-1887 180-83 (1995)
(criticizing the corruption and anti-democratic nature of the media in the United States).
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was the Golden Age of media criticism. 8 In 1920, Upton Sinclair's The
Brass Check: A Study of American Journalism was published. This
breathtaking 440 page account of the corruption of journalism by
moneyed interests sold some 150,000 copies by the mid 1920s. 9 All but
forgotten in the intervening years, it is a book that could well be the
starting point for all assessments of journalism, if not contemporary
media, in the United States. The topic of media control became a part of
progressive political organizing. The great progressive Robert La
Follette devoted a chapter of his book on political philosophy to the
crisis of the press. "[M]oney power," he wrote, "controls the newspaper
press .... wherever news items bear in any way upon the control of
government by business, the news is colored."10
It was as a response to the crisis in journalism that the revolutionary
idea of professional journalism-the formal separation of the owner
from the editorial function-emerged as the solution to the crisis.'1
Citizens no longer needed to worry about private monopoly control over
the news; trained professionals serving the public interest were in charge
and had the power. It was in this period that schools of journalism were
formed. None existed before 1900; by 1920 the majority of major
programs had been established, sometimes under strong pressure from
leading newspaper publishers-desperate to reclaim legitimacy for their
industry-over their state legislatures. 12
2. 1925-1935
The second great critical juncture surrounded the rise of radio
broadcasting in the 1920s and early 1930s; this was the subject of my
dissertation and my first book. 3
See OUR UNFREE PRESS, supra note 6, at 13.
Robert W. McChesney & Ben Scott, Introduction to UPTON SINCLAIR, THE BRASS
CHECK: A STUDY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM ix, xiii (University of Illinois Press 2002) (1920).
8.
9.

10. ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, The Press and the Public, in THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE: AS REVEALED IN HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 345, 345 (Ellen Torelle

ed., 1920).
11. McChesney & Scott, supra note 9, at xxvi-xxix.
12. Robert W. McChesney, Waging the Media Battle, http://freepress.net/action/tools/
waging-battle.pdf (last visited July 7, 2007) [hereinafter McChesney, Waging].
13. ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE
BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, 3 (1993) [hereinafter
MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS].

The foundation for my dissertation was provided by reading Jerome Barron and
Alexander Meiklejohn in graduate school. It is hard for me to exaggerate the importance of their
work upon my thinking. In the 1980s it was commonly presented that the First Amendment was an
historical commandment that commercial media were protected from any government regulation,
except in broadcasting, regardless of the content that these media firms produced. Barron and
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It was on Jerome Barron and Alexander Meiklejohn's foundation
that in my research I discovered that there was in fact a serious debate
over whether the United States should adopt commercial broadcasting in
the early 1930s. It was not seen by anyone at the time that corporateowned, advertising-supported broadcasting was the natural American
system. 14 That came later, when the PR went into fifth gear after the
system was consolidated. It certainly was not regarded as inherently
democratic. (As the BBC put it at the time, the claim by capitalist
broadcasters that commercial broadcasting was democratic was "outside
our comprehension" and "clearly springs from a peculiarly American
conception of democracy."' 5)
In the early 1930s citizens from across the political spectrumprobably as many Republicans as Democrats-made compelling
arguments that the commercial broadcasting system produced results
that were inimical to the needs of a democratic society, and that the
policy making process in Washington was grotesquely corrupt, and
served the interests of powerful media owners. The reformers wanted a
significant nonprofit and noncommercial broadcasting sector, ideally
dominant.' 6 And although the reformers lost-I will not keep you in
suspense-they failed primarily because of the corruption of the process,
not because the American people opted for commercial broadcasting. I
argued that this battle over the control and structure of radio
17
broadcasting was the last great battle over media in the United States.
Thereafter, concerning FM radio, terrestrial television, and cable and
satellite television, policymakers always assumed that corporations
would rule media to maximize profits from advertising and this was the
Meiklejohn both challenged that notion of the First Amendment in a powerful manner. Meiklejohn
elegantly made the case for the direct relationship of the First Amendment to self-government,
destroying the notion that the First Amendment was meant to protect commercial investment in
communication industries first and foremost. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965). Barron's seminal 1967 piece in the HarvardLaw

Review built upon that and made a case for the need for a political economy of media of the First
Amendment, if freedom of the press was going to be effective. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the
Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). Their interpretation of the
First Amendment drew my attention in an important way to the relationship of policies, structures,
media content and democratic governance in the Anglo-American legal tradition. There was no
reason to assume a corporate-dominated, advertising-supported, profit-obsessed media system was
the natural or proper press system in the United States.
14. Robert W. McChesney, The 1997 Spry Memorial Lecture: The Mythology of Commercial
Broadcasting and the Contemporary Crisis of Public Broadcasting (Dec. 2, 1997), available at
www.ratical.com/co-globalize/RMmythCB.pdf [hereinafter McChesney, 1997 Lecture].
15. American Broadcasting,in B.B.C. Y.B. 47 (1932).
16. McChesney, 1997 Lecture, supra note 14.
17.

MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 13, at 3-4.
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desire of the public-the confirmed "American way"--so the public
played no role in the process.
I determined that the struggle over radio broadcasting qualified as a
critical juncture because it met two of the three criteria I laid out.
Broadcasting was a revolutionary communication technology that did
not conform to existing business or regulatory patterns. In addition, there
was an immediate crisis in the nature of the content of radio
broadcasting. While some opponents of the status quo disliked what they
regarded as the class bias of commercial radio, there was widespread,
nearly universal, dislike of advertising on radio before people became
accustomed to it and accepted it as a necessary evil. 18 It was something
everyone acknowledged at the time. One of the reasons the commercial
broadcasters were so dead set against any form of noncommercial
broadcasting in the early 1930s is that they were convinced no one
would listen to their stations if there was quality noncommercial
broadcasting available on the dial. It was these two factors that spawned
the birth of the broadcast reform movement I chronicled in my book.' 9
It is the third factor, the need for a period of broad social turmoil,
ironically enough, that doomed the reform effort. Although the 1930s is
associated with radical politics and sweeping reform, the fight over radio
was completed by 1934, before this was much of a factor. My hunch is
that had radio developed five to ten years later, and the policy fights had
fallen at the end of the 1930s, the political climate might have been
much more supportive of the reform efforts. The Congress of Industrial
Organizations ("CIO"), for example, was far more hostile to commercial
broadcasting than the American Federation of Labor had ever been. z°
But by the time the CIO was formed in the late 1930s, the topic of who
owned and controlled radio broadcasting was off the table. As the CIO
understood well, by losing control over broadcasting to the commercial
system, it made labor's job of winning progressive political fights vastly
more difficult.
III.

FIVE CORE TRUTHS

Over the course of the past decade or so, a new wave of critical
scholarship has continued that has examined the policymaking critical

18.

Id. at 92-93, 101-06.

19.

Id. at 5.

20. ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS
IN DUBIOUS TIMES 292 (1999) [hereinafter MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA].
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junctures in United States communication history. 21 Likewise, and
urging this on, the media reform movement has blossomed. As a result
five core truths have emerged that explain and guide progressive forces
in this critical juncture. As you will see, the fingerprints of Professor
Barron are all over one of them, and inspire the remainder. These five
truths provide a way for communication scholars to share the
significance of their work with a populace that has deep and pressing
concerns about the role media play in their lives.
A.

Media Systems and Society

First, media systems are not naturally run by profit-making
concerns in the marketplace, often supported by advertising placed by
other profit-making firms. Not in the United States. Not anywhere. They
are created by societies, generally through explicit government policies
and usually with direct or indirect subsidies.22 The type of media
systems societies end up with are strongly influenced by the political
economy of the nation, but it is not a mechanistic or vulgar relationship.
Even in communist societies, expected to toe the Marxist-Leninist line,
there was not a "default" media system.23 It was pretty clear that control
over the media would be under the thumb of the party or the state or
labor federations or even the military, but it was not clear which of them
or which combination of them would rule. It was not clear how the
institutions would be structured, or how large the budgets would be or
what the goals of the media institutions would be. Nor was it clear how
many media imports from other communist nations or the noncommunist world would be permitted. Different communist societies
came up with differing media systems.2 4 And that is in an authoritarian
society with little public involvement in decision-making.
The matter is even clearer when we turn to democratic societies.
That commercial media is not a "default" system is clear from liberal
democratic political theory: A free people opt for the institution of
private property because they regard it as the best way to advance their

21.

For an in-depth discussion of this scholarship see MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note

22.
23.

McChesney, Waging, supra note 12.
See Robert W. McChesney, Thesis on Media Deregulation,25 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC'Y

4.

125 (2003) [hereinafter McChesney, Thesis].
24.

See id.
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values.25 Likewise, a free people opt for commercial media because they
determine it is the best way to promote the type of press system they
deem desirable.26 In democratic theory, a free people may decide to have
a non-capitalist economy, and likewise they may decide to have a
noncommercial media system.
But, to be clear, the two matters are distinct. Even in capitalist
societies, it is not a given that the entirety of the media or
communication system will be run for profit. Capitalist societies,
including the United States, have had elements, sometimes significant
elements, of their communication systems operate outside the
marketplace during their history. When telegraphy came along, or radio
broadcasting nearly a century later, the United States was certainly a
capitalist nation, but there were debates about whether these emerging
industries should be conducted by private profit-maximizing concerns,
even by people who favored capitalism otherwise. 2 ' Even today,
professional journalism, perhaps the defining characteristic of our free
press in our media textbooks, is explicitly a public service that does not,
at its best, follow the commercial logic of the companies that house it. A
core principle of professional journalism is to provide a safehouse for
public service in the swamp of commercialism.28
This is not simply a theoretical or philosophical argument. Nor is it
an argument made only by scholars who oppose commercial media, or
are as critical of commercial media as I am. In 2004 two books were
published that laid out this basic argument: my The Problem of the
Media, and Paul Starr's The Creation of the Media.2 9 Starr relied upon
secondary sources, but he did a masterful job nonetheless marshaling the
evidence and chronicling how the United States government has
"created" the media with a series of policies and subsidies since the
beginning of the Republic. There was no natural "free market" default
option. Starr contends creating a viable free press is one of the nation's
crowning achievements, 30 and I agree. Starr is far from critical of the

25. Interview with Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize Winner, Commanding Heights on PBS
(Oct. 1, 2000) available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/
int_miltonfriedman.html.
26.
27.

MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, supra note 20, at 6-7.
MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 4, at 34-36, 38-40.

28. Id. at 83.
29. See MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 4;

PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS (2004). This argument is also
supported by others. See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA
AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 1-3 (1998).
MEDIA:

30.

STARR, supra note 29, at 2-3, 14-16, 19.
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way the media system has developed in the United States to the present
day. He distinctly announces his support for the current corporatecontrolled media system which he regards as being largely a success, in
need of only minor policy tinkering that can be done with the existing
toolkit.3 ' Mark Lloyd has done more research and made a compatible
argument about the centrality of government policies to the formation of
the communication system in his 2006 book, Prologue to a Farce:
Communication and Democracy in America.32 In fact, I know of no
evidence that contradicts this position. Yet countless communication
scholars and pundits continue to gloss over it on their way to the notion
that our media system is naturally commercial, the result of free-market
competition, and any fundamental challenge to commercialism is antidemocratic or un-American, or both.33
B. The True Meaning of "Freedomof the Press"
Second, along these lines, the First Amendment is not a piece of
protectionist legislation meant to grant special privileges to investors in
the communication sector to be exempt from government regulation. It
does not lock us into the status quo and render all structural media
reforms unconstitutional. The oft-stated "libertarian," or, more
accurately, neoliberal position-the idea that the Constitution requires
that capitalists be the natural rulers of all media and they could do as
they pleased without government interference, regardless of the nature of
the content they provided-is dubious, if not bogus. That is not the
consensus opinion of the Supreme Court in its handful of important
cases on the meaning of freedom of the press. 34 Yet the idea that
freedom of the press means the government shall not interfere with
media capitalists is commonly accepted among the laity as well as
communication scholars as very close to the truth, if not an exact bullseye. A good deal of the reason for this is that freedom of speech is often
31. Paul Star, Democratic Theory and the History of Communications, Paper Presented at
Back to the Future: Explorations in Communication and History, A Symposium at the Annenberg
School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania (Dec. 1, 2006).
32.

MARK LLOYD, PROLOGUE TO A FARCE: COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY INAMERICA

(2006) (discussing the relationship of government policies to the development of media
communication).
33. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. GERSHON, THE TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA CORPORATION:
GLOBAL MESSAGES AND FREE MARKET COMPETITION (1997) (discussing the media system and free

market competition).
34. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76, 392 (1969) (upholding the
FCC's "fairness doctrine" and holding that the First Amendment does not protect unlimited private
censorship in broadcasting); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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conflated with freedom of the press. Few people would condone
government censorship of an individual's speech rights; by extension
how can we condone the government's regulation of an individual's (or
media corporation's) free press rights? Likewise, if one assumes that the
market rules media, then the concern of the First Amendment is to keep
the government not only off the backs of media firms, but also their
audiences. As Thurgood Marshall put it in 1969: "If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. 3 5 Such
a noble position is heartily encouraged by the large media corporations.
It shifts attention away from them, and assumes their role as natural.
I could never square this conventional view with what I saw in the
1930s and my own analysis of history and of Supreme Court opinions.
This point crystallized for me when I was doing my research on the
1930s broadcast reform movement. I was struck by the position of the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") that commercial
broadcasting, by its very nature, might violate the First Amendment. In
essence, the ACLU argued that the profit motive in broadcasting was
inconsistent with the First Amendment, which was Alexander
Meiklejohn's position.3 6 The ACLU adjusted its position once the
commercial system became inviolate politically by the late 1930s, but its
initial opposition to the emerging status quo was driven by a very
different notion of the First Amendment than I was immersed in as a
student.37 During my research, I came across the work of Thomas
Emerson, long considered a leading expert on the First Amendment in
his stead at Yale Law School. Emerson made it clear that in the 1930s,
nothing in the Constitution authorized commercial broadcasting or
prevented the government from establishing a completely nonprofit
radio and television system.38 Indeed, all of the Supreme Court decisions
on government regulation of broadcasting and cable to date have made
the First Amendment first and foremost a right of all Americans-rich or

35.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).

36. Malcolm Pitman Sharp, Foreword to MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at xv-xvii.
37. Robert W. McChesney, Constant Retreat: The American Civil Liberties Union and the
Debate Over the Meaning of Free Speech for Radio Broadcastingin the 1930s, in 26 FREE SPEECH
YEARBOOK 40-59 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 1987).
38. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1966) (analyzing the values underlying the First Amendment).
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poor-more than a private privilege for the handful 39of Americans who
can afford to purchase successful commercial media.
The standard common sense interpretation of freedom of the press
acknowledged that broadcasting and cable were different from
everything else, due to spectrum scarcity and government licensing.
There the First Amendment belonged to the public, whose interests are
represented by the government. But once spectrum scarcity ends, and
monopoly licensing ends, those areas will revert back to the unregulated
media realm enjoyed by newspapers. Then freedom of the press will
belong, as Liebling famously put it, to those that own them. 40 To the
media firms, we live happily ever after.
But that did not make sense to me either. I never got the sense that
that was what the First Amendment intended for freedom of the press, or
that that was how it was universally interpreted by the Supreme Court.
During the founding period, when freedom of the press was being
discussed, often led by Jefferson and Madison, there is no sense that they
regarded the press as an inherently market-driven institution, where the
right to make profit was sacrosanct. 41 The Founders provided massive
printing and postal subsidies to spawn newspapers the market would
have never countenanced, and the press was seen not as a business
enterprise but as a quasi-formal and indispensable branch of
government, the fourth estate.4 z Ed Baker has argued persuasively that
permits the government to play an active role in
the First Amendment
43
creating media.
Moreover, when the Supreme Court has actually pondered what
freedom of the press, the industrial production of journalism, meant in
the First Amendment, it has not endorsed the neoliberal model of profits
iiber alles.44 In some of the most important of those cases the opinions
suggest that freedom of the press is not an individual right to do with as
they please, primarily to make money. To the contrary, the matter is far
39. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112-13
(1973); Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 389-90.
40.

A.J. Liebling, The Wayward Press: Do You Belong in Journalism?, THE NEW YORKER,

May 14, 1960, at 105, 109 ("Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one.").
41. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 45-50 (1991).

42. See id. at 233-34, 260-61.
43. Whenever I write about freedom of the press issues and the Constitution I find myself
invoking the name Ed Baker, because his work provides the foundation on which I stand. His latest
book is an instant classic: C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY
OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2007).

44. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
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more central: freedom of the press is in the Constitution to make selfgovernment possible. Consider this from Hugo Black's magnificent
majority opinion in the 1945 Associated Press v. United States case:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom
of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should
be read as a command that the government was without power to
protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an
argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides

powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a

command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to
keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment
does not
45
sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.
Or consider what Black wrote twenty-six years later in the

Pentagon Papers (New York Times Co. v. United States) case:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The
Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and
inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively
expose deception in government. And paramount among the
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them
46 off to distant
lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.

Or this from Justice Potter Stewart in the same case:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an

45. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
46. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
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informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the
values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here
that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic
an informed and free
purpose of the First Amendment. For without
47
press there cannot be an enlightened people.
These statements by Black and Stewart about the importance of the
press for monitoring the government's proclivity for foreign wars are
especially striking because this was a central concern of James Madison,
who thought unchecked militarism was probably the greatest threat to
the republic.4 8
In short, the spirit in several of these opinions is that the state has
not only the right, but the duty, to see that a viable press system exists,
for if such a media system does not exist the entire constitutional project
will fail. If the existing press system is failing, it is imperative that the
state create a system that will meet the constitutionally mandated
requirements. At any rate, these opinions hardly suggest the First
Amendment is meant to provide a constitutional blank check to
corporate media to do as they please, regardless of the implications for
self-government. At the same time, this is nothing if not a complex
matter. The problem of establishing a press system, providing direct and
indirect subsidies, yet preventing censorship and state domination defies
simple solution. And there may be no ideal solution, only a range of
solutions where some are better than others.
So there remains debate on the First Amendment, and my position
is one of many. Those who tend to disagree with my position tend to
point to Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 9 In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the government could not regulate the press as
it did broadcasting, and to some this is a clear indication of the Court's
"media are innately capitalist" orientation. I agree this is evidence on the
other side, at least for the view that spectrum scarcity is the primary
justification for the different treatment of broadcasting from other media.
But I hasten to point out, as Ed Baker says,50 that in that case the
Supreme Court conflated the interests of editors and owners, making
them identical. It made an eloquent argument for why the state could not
censor editors, and at that level I quite agree with the Court's decision.

47. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. For examples of Madison's concerns, as well a detailed presentation of the rich antimilitarist and anti-imperialist tradition in American politics, see AGAINST THE BEAST: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO EMPIRE (John Nichols ed., 2004).
49. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
50. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 171-72 (2004).
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But it did not really take up the issue of what happens if the interests of
owners and editors are opposed, as they often are, assuming editors are
not fired. What does that mean in monopolistic or semi-monopolistic
markets where it is impossible for new owners to emerge to hire new
editors? What happens to freedom of the press when the right to launch
effective new media is non-existent in the market or effectively limited
to billionaires, and the investors have no more interest in journalism than
they do in insurance or producing undergarments? All they care about is
profit. That framing, the actual record in the United States, the real
world in which we live and die, remains to be discussed by the Supreme
Court.
In short, how precisely the Supreme Court will come to interpret
freedom of the press in the First Amendment in the digital era is up in
the air. I suspect what happens with scholarship, and, even more
important, with citizen activism, will go a long way toward influencing
the outcome. If history is any guide, the Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment will be flexible enough to accommodate the gist of
what emerges from the critical juncture. For present purposes, my point
is simply that there is nothing in the Constitution itself, or Supreme
Court decisions to date, that mandates a neoliberal, or even capitalist,
course.
C. Subsidies
Third, the media and communication systems in the United States
have been the recipients of enormous direct and indirect subsidies,
5'
arguably as great as or greater than any other industry in our economy.
When communication firms claim they work in free markets, it should
provoke more howls than a Jerry Lewis film festival in France. All
commercial enterprises benefit by government spending, and hence get
indirect subsidies. Businesses use the roads, take advantage of a
workforce educated in public schools, etc. But the subsidies provided to
media and communication firms go far beyond that. Everyone thinks of
the value of the monopoly licenses that are given for free to commercial
radio and TV stations or to spectrum for satellite television, or monopoly
cable TV and telephone franchises. When the value of the broadcast
spectrum has been estimated it is put in the billions of dollars

51.

MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, supra note 20, at 142. See also Donald L. Barlett & James B.

Steele, Special Report: Corporate Welfare, a System Exposed, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at 36-54
(investigating the system of "corporate welfare" in the American economy).
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historically.52 Lord knows the precise value of the indirect public
subsidy created by AT&T's telephone monopoly over the years. Add to
that the still enormous postal subsidies for magazines, state and local
subsidies for film studios, and the amount of money the government
spends on advertising or purchasing media products like books for
schools. The government also goes to considerable expense to train
people to read, and hence be in the market for media products. Or
consider the billions spent on TV political advertising every election
cycle; policies effectively dictate that funds given to political campaigns
end up in the pockets of those firms given monopoly licenses to the
airwaves. Perhaps the largest subsidy of them all is copyright, a
government created and enforced monopoly right meant to eliminate the
possibility of competitive markets.5 3 Accountants do not keep track of
the value copyright creates for its holders, but lawsuits over the spoils
suggest it is staggering. And there are many additional subsidies beyond
these. No one has done any of this math systematically yet, but in
combination these are subsidies of private firms to the tune of arguably
hundreds of billions of dollars annually.
The term "government subsidies" is increasingly held in disrepute,
so let me be clear about this. I think subsidies can be good, and I think
that in principle they are necessary. It is in our interests that the extent
and role of subsidies in our media system be recognized and appreciated.
Copyright, for example, is a necessary evil, a "tax on knowledge" as the
Founders understood it when it was put in the Constitution.54 Our
Founders regarded subsidies, in effect, as the price of civilization, or at
least a viable republic. I know we have had them from the beginning of
the republic and as Paul Starr concludes, they have been essential to the
job of creating a viable free press. 5 Many, if not most, of our major
communication revolutions, from radio to satellite communication to the
Internet, were spawned as a result of massive government subsidies.
Even if one wanted a truly "free market" media system, without
direct or indirect subsidies, it would be awfully difficult, if not
impossible, to construct. And, ironically, to implement and maintain
anything remotely close to a truly competitive market would require
extensive government coordination, probably far beyond what currently

52. See, e.g., Harold Hallikainen, Spectrum for Sale or Rent, 5 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 5
(2000), http://www.hallikainen.org/ijlp/ijclp-webdoc_6_5.2000.pdf.
53. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
54. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Why Thomas Jefferson Would Love Napster (July 3, 2001),

http://stayfreemagazine.org/ml/readings/siva_jefferson.pdf.
55. STARR, supranote 29, at 89-90.
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exists. It would never happen naturally. But this is a discussion best left
to the parlor room at the Ayn Rand Institute because the last thing the
dominant commercial interests want is their subsidies removed, and, as
far as I can tell, when the rubber hits the road all the "free market" think
tanks are dedicated to promoting corporate domination in concentrated
markets of the heavily subsidized communication system, rather than
ending the heavily subsidized communication system. (One need only
look at how the self-proclaimed pro-free market editorial page of the
Wall Street Journal carries water for AT&T and the big governmentcreated telephone and cable powerhouses to see how the notion of free
markets in the realm of media and telecommunication is mostly a
rhetorical ploy to protect entrenched monopolistic power.56)
D. The Policymaking Process
So the question is not whether we will have subsidies and policies,
but, rather, what will be the subsidies and policies and what institutions
will they support and what values will they encourage and promote? The
other side of the coin is that some policies and institutions and values
will not be supported. This takes us to the heart of the matter, and to our
fourth point of truth: the importance not just of policies, but more
specifically of the policymaking process. When we talk about media,
what most of us are concerned with, ultimately, is the content that the
media system produces and what effect that has upon our lives. But the
content is shaped to a significant extent by the institutional structures of
media systems, which is why political theorists devote so much time to
studying that issue.57 And the institutional structures are determined by
policies and subsidies which are in turn determined by the policymaking
process. So that takes us to the nucleus of the media atom. This has been
a largely overlooked area in communication, but can be no longer.
Allow me to refer to economics again for an analogy. As a student
in the 1970s I had a professor who argued that when judging whether a
nation was independent and advanced economically-whether it was
"developed"-the key factor was not the level of GDP, the amount of
consumer goods produced and consumed. He also said that the key was
not the size of the capital goods sector, those industries like steel and

56. For a recent example, see Opinion, Net Discrimination,WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at A22.
57. See generally STARR, supra note 29 (discussing the constitutive choices made by
policymakers in shaping the communications media); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It
Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 368-69 (1997) (discussing how varied media structures influence
consumer preferences and the content of the media).
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glass that provided the materials needed to produce consumer goods. He
said the key to evaluating an economy's vitality was the size and
strength of its sector that produced capital goods, meaning, especially,
the machine tools sector. If a nation was strong there, it could adapt to
changing circumstances and control its fate. This was striking to me and
my fellow students, because while we knew about consumer goods and
we knew all about the steel industry, we had barely considered the
seemingly minuscule industry of manufacturing the tools that made
capital goods. That, he said, was the key. I do not know whether this
theory is widely accepted or whether it is dismissed as hooey among
economists today, but it provides a nice manner to think about media.
Consumer goods are the content of the media people consume with the
effects that concern us. Capital goods are the structures and policies that
produce the content. And the machine tool sector of media is the
policymaking process that produces the policies and subsidies that create
the media structures. That is where one must go to get to the root of the
problem. If you understand that, it is a short path to understanding how
the system will work, and how it can be changed.
When one examines the policymaking process, one can see what
the real options are, and why a system later regarded as "natural" got put
in place as it did. It is becoming a new area of intense research in
communication history. In particular, for reasons already made clear, the
research places particular emphasis upon critical junctures, as those are
the moments in policymaking history when the range of debate is
relatively broad and society can go in any number of directions with its
media policies and subsidies.
E. Secrecy and Corruption
These first four points lead directly to opening up new research
areas for scholars; the fifth and final truth is the one that results from this
research and fans the flames of citizen activism. This final truth is
simply that the policymaking process in the United States has grown
increasingly secretive and corrupt as media and communication have
become ever-increasingly lucrative industries. The policies and subsidies
are made in the public's name, but without the public's informed
consent. Much of my research has chronicled and analyzed this
corruption.5 8 In my talks and writings I like to use the metaphor of the

58.

See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, Waging, supra note 12; MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note

4, at 11-12.
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59
famous Havana patio scene in The Godfather II,
where Michael
Corleone, Hyman Roth and the American gangsters are dividing up
Cuba between themselves during the dictator Batista's era. After
divvying up the spoils, Hyman Roth states how great it is to be in Cuba,
with a friendly government that supports "private enterprise." That is
pretty much how communication policymaking has been conducted in
the United States. Monopoly broadcast licenses, copyright extensions,
tax subsidies, the works, are doled out all the time but the public has no
idea what is going on. Extremely powerful lobbyists battle it out with
each other-like Michael Corleone and Hyman Roth-to get cushy
deals from the FCC, whose members and top staffers almost inevitably
60
move to private industry to cash in after their stint in "public service.',
More than anything, the FCC has been dedicated to making the
dominant firms bigger and more profitable above all else. Congress, too,
is under the thumb of big money. The one thing the big firms-just like
Roth and Corleone-all agree upon is that it is their system and the
public has no role to play in the policymaking process. And because the
news media almost never cover this story in the general news, ninetynine percent of the public has no idea what is going on. If anything, they
are fed a plateful of free market hokum, extolling an industry mandated
by the Constitution that "gives the people what they want."
There is little challenge to this assessment of the corrupt and antidemocratic nature of the policymaking process. The empirical evidence
is devastating: In the first six months of 2006 alone, communication and
technology firms spent $172 million on lobbying in Washington, more
than any other sector or group. 61 In view of what is at stake in terms of
government subsidies and licenses, this is not a surprise. They spend this
amount because, like Roth and Corleone, they are fighting with each
other for the biggest slice of the pie, though, with the emergence of the
media reform movement, some portion of that is now taking into
consideration Leona Helmsley's little people. Even those who benefit by
the policymaking system concede that it has been an insiders game with
a bankroll in the hundreds of millions or billions the ante for admission.
In the past, it was overlooked, because, despite the corruption, the
system seemed to be working. The policies seemed marginal in scope

59. See, e.g., Robert W. McChesney, USC Annenberg Colloquium: The Politics of Media,
Technology & Culture (Feb. 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.learcenter.org/images/
event uploads//BollierMcChesney.pdf); MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 4, at 48.
60. See, e.g., Former FCC ChairmanKennard to Join Carlyle, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at
C16.

61.

Amy Schatz, Industry Bracesfor Net-NeutralityFallout,WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at A3.
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and technocratic, and it was no big deal. (Benjamin Compaine has been
one of the few defenders of the policymaking status quo. He argues that
the policymaking process is as democratic as it could possibly be,
because the various large lobbies duking it out behind closed doors
prevent excessive corruption from resulting.62 ) But now that the system
is breaking up it is becoming a very big deal. Policymaking is much like
the man behind the curtain in The Wizard of Oz. 63 The corporate media

lobbies do not want people to look there because when people do, they
see that the entire rationale for our media system rests upon a fairy tale
about free markets.
This fairy tale of free markets is the fig leaf, if you will pardon the
mixed metaphor, that protects the corporate media system from the
public review it deserves. I recall an exchange I had with one Jack
Fuller, a top executive of the Tribune Company, at a conference on the
future of family-owned newspapers at the University of Illinois in 2002.
Fuller, the president of the Tribune's publishing subsidiary, was
presented as the thinking person's media boss, because he has written
some books.64 Fuller thundered to the audience about how offensive he
found it that he even had to travel to Washington D.C., and countenance
the right of the government to have any say whatsoever over the affairs
of his company. He said he found that to be a dire attack on the First
Amendment. I asked Mr. Fuller about the many extremely valuable
monopoly radio and TV licenses that the Tribune Company accepted
from the government at no charge, and how that affected him as he was
working up his anger over government meddling in the affairs of the
Tribune. Fuller paused and explained that the Tribune Company had no
interest in broadcasting but had been asked by the government to take
the valuable monopoly licenses. We were left to assume that nobody else
wanted the opportunity to have a multi-million-dollar industry handed to
them at no charge, and the Tribune Company was just being a good
Samaritan, helping out a government in distress.
In fact, Fuller had it exactly wrong. Back in the 1920s the Tribune
Company sent its top lawyer, Louis Caldwell, to Washington D.C. to
work for the government's newly created Federal Radio Commission,
specifically to allocate the radio stations to commercial interests.65 At the

62.

Benjamin

M.

Compaine,

The Myths of Encroaching Global Media Ownership,

OPENDEMOCRACY 1, 5 (Nov. 6, 2001), http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articies/PDF/87.pdf.
63. L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ (Random House, Inc. 2003).
64. See, e.g., JACK FULLER, FRAGMENTS (1984); JACK FULLER, NEWS VALUES: IDEAS FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE (1996).

65. Robert W. McChesney, Free Speech and Democracy! Louis G. Caldwell, the American
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time, Caldwell argued that the government needed to have draconian
power over selecting who was allowed to have a monopoly radio
broadcasting license, and, conversely, who was not. Caldwell argued
that determining the rulers of the airwaves was a government job of such
magnitude it could not be trusted to as democratic a body as Congress,
which might be unduly influenced by people without sufficient expertise
to make the right call.66 This expertise was to be found, apparently,
exclusively in the hands of engineers and lawyers working for the
commercial broadcasting industry. Coincidentally, as a result of
Caldwell's labor, the Tribune Company's WGN was awarded, at no
charge, one of the handful of clear channel signals, worth, even then,
countless millions of dollars.67 Once the commercial system was in
place, and the lucrative monopoly licenses had been doled out in
complete secrecy, Caldwell did a 180 degree turn, and argued that any
regulation of commercial broadcasting violated the First Amendment.6 8
In effect, the public airwaves should be privatized and turned over to
those authorized by Louis Caldwell and his cronies. Jack Fuller is
carrying on in Caldwell's tradition. 69
Once the-importance of the policymaking process is understood,
and the corruption of the process is grasped, it changes our
understanding of communication dramatically. Consider the term
"deregulation," which is used frequently by journalists and scholars to
describe when big media firms look to see media ownership rules
relaxed or eliminated. If we had a free market media system, this use of
the term would be accurate, in the sense that market forces would play a
larger role than the state in setting the terms of competition. But in
broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication, the term is purely
propagandistic. It is meant to imply a competitive market outcome
because that is seen as desirable, when in fact it leads to far less market
competition.70 So when radio ownership rules were "deregulated" in the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 7 1 that did not mean that lots of new

Bar Association and the Debate over the Free Speech Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 19281938, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 357-58 (1991) [hereinafter McChesney, FreeSpeech].
66. Id. at 369-70.
67. Id. at 366; Geoffrey L. Thomas, Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22
STAN. L. REV. 863, 884 n.120 (1970).
68. McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 65, at 352.
69. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
70. See James B. Speta, DeregulatingTelecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2004).
71. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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small firms could enter radio broadcasting and compete with the giants
without having to get the FCC's permission. It meant, instead, that a
small number of firms were permitted to gobble up even more monopoly
radio licenses from the government and establish- vastly greater market
power.72 The FCC was doing just as much regulation, only now it was
simply regulating on behalf of the big guys. Deregulation in media
policymaking means, in reality, re-regulation purely to serve powerful
corporate interests with no concern for the general public whatsoever.
The firms that dominate our media and communications systems seem to
be there as much because they are spectacularly successful in lobbying
as they have earned the confidence of the public.
Why these truths came together and had such power by the early
2000s was that the signs of being in the beginning stages of a critical
juncture were all around us. If policymaking was about to move from the
margins to the center as a new communication system was to be
determined, these five truths, to the extent they were understood, were
incendiary and potentially revolutionary. And we have seen, in the past
five years, the striking development of the media reform movement.
People are organizing to demand local media ownership, an open and
accessible Internet, viable public media, limits of the commercial carpetbombing of childhood and society at large, policies to encourage viable
journalism; the list goes on and on. In 2007, Eric Klinenberg's Fighting
for Air: The Battle to Control America's Media was published. It was
the first scholarly examination of this burgeoning movement that
grasped its historical significance.7 3 It will not be the last.
The experience of Free Press, the group I co-founded, provides the
most compelling evidence of the movement's growth. In the four years
since its creation, Free Press has grown to some thirty staff members,
has an annual budget of around $3 million, and is approaching 400,000
members.7 4 Granted, Free Press dwarfs nearly all the other groups in the
field, but its growth is a testament to the changing times in which we
live. The dynamism of the media reform movement was apparent at the
third National Conference for Media Reform, organized by Free Press
and held in Memphis from January 12-14, 2007. Registration had to be
suspended because of the flush of demand to attend the conference. As it
was, more than 3,000 people attended from all fifty states. If I had
72.

73.

See Speta, supra note 70, at 1121.
ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S MEDIA

(2007).
74. As the co-founder and because of my public visibility, I often receive credit for the work
of the extraordinary Free Press staff, which is entirely misplaced.
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speculated that this would take place merely five years ago, I would
have been dismissed as a wild-eyed professor. Had I made this
prediction one or two decades ago, and persisted after the laughter faded,
it would have been grounds for insanity. There is something happening
here.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Finally, to circle back to my point of departure, invariably what
occurs in a critical juncture will be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and
its constitutionality will be measured. What the First Amendment means
for freedom of the press is likely to be determined in the coming
generation, and scholars, legal and communication, need to prepare for it
beginning immediately. There has been tremendous pressure to make the
First Amendment into a piece of protective legislation for media
corporations and commercial values, although the Courts have not gone
all the way in that direction. As cases work their way through the system
in the coming generation, we need to have hard empirical research as
well as thoughtful treatises on the relationship of free press to selfgovernance and what this means for the First Amendment. It is still to be
determined. The important point is that this is not a legalistic matter to
be left to the lawyers; it is the most fundamental of policies that requires
the direct and indirect participation of communication scholars and
engaged citizens. The simplistic interpretation of the First Amendment
proffered by self-interest communication corporations and swallowed in
whole by too many communication scholars at present is insufficient to
the task at hand. Jerome Barron's critical approach is having its moment
in the sun. His question is becoming everyone's question.
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